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1. Introduction
Until the beginnings of the Collor presidency in 1990, the Brazilian government strongly
protected domestic producers of electronics goods. The justification and policies for protecting
"informatics" producers changed over the 1970s and 1980s, but the character of the outcome did not.
Many anecdotes suggest that the policies failed to achieve their stated goals in many markets. Most
observers argue that Brazilian firms did not come close to reaching parity with their potential
international competitors (e.g., Reyes et al (1990) and SEI (1988)). These laws and their
consequences contain important lessons about how and why government nurturing of high-technology
industries may fail (See Luzio [19931 for a review).
In this paper we move beyond the anecdotes that underlie previous studies. We provide and
analyze systematic evidence of the performance of Brazilian microcomputer suppliers. We chose to
study microcomputers because of their importance in the world data-processing market. In addition,
the performance of this industry is better documented than any other. Because the Brazilian domestic
market was largely dominated by Brazilian versions of IBM-PCs and Apple clones, we can directly
compare the performance of the Brazilian industry with potential international competitors.
Our data set is one novelty of this paper ~ it is an eight year time series of price and
performance characteristics for all Brazilian-produced microcomputers. Our methods are standard in
the economics of technical change: we employ hedonic techniques (Berndt and Griliches [1993]) to
evaluate the rate of advance in the industry and to evaluate the performance of the Brazilian industry
relative to international standards. These methods are not common to studies of infant industries,
perhaps because the necessary data is rarely available. We think that the success of the methods here
(and the increasing availability of product market data) may suggest similar applications in related
issues of development economics.
Our quantitative analysis provides measures of the industry's development. First, we show
2that our measure of the Brazilian PC industry's price/performance often advanced at a rate that was
comparable to international rates of advance. Second, despite this advance, the Brazilian industry
never caught up to the leaders. The prices of domestically produced Brazilian PCs started higher and
always stayed higher than their potential international competition. A similar computer model cost
between 70 and 100 percent more in Brazil than in international markets. Technical frontiers typically
lagged price/performance practices in international markets by at least 3 years and as much as 5.
Third, we calculate a lower bound estimate for the opportunity cost of protecting the microcomputer
industry rather than opening up to international markets. Forgone buyer surplus was on the order of
143.3 million US dollars per year, or roughly 32.88 percent of the average annual expenditure on
domestically produced microcomputers. Fourth, the installation of the CoUor regime dramatically
affected the performance of Brazilian firms. Brazilian suppliers and buyers reacted quickly to CoUor's
public promise to dismantle the previous protective informatics policy. Domestic firms slashed prices,
shut down inefficient product lines, and those remaining quickly came much closer to international
price/performance standards.
To begin with, we briefly review the history of the informatics laws in Brazil. Then we
discuss the data and present hedonic analysis of the industry's performance. We finish with a
comparison of Brazilian performance against international standards. This comparison leads to an
estimate of the opportunity costs to Brazil of protecting their domestic microcomputer industry.
2. A brief history of the informatics laws
In 1977 the Brazilian military government initiated policies designed to protect domestic
"informatics" firms, building on a history of protecting other domestic firms (Tigre [1983], Evans
[1986]). In contrast widi the previous experiences with import substitution (see Baer [1988], [1989],
Fishlow [1990]), the informatics policy was characterized by the pursuit of technological autonomy
3and the almost absolute exclusion of foreign companies'. The scope of the protection initially
extended to micro and minicomputers, but gradually expanded to a wide variety of data-processing
devices and their inputs.
The laws differed in their effectiveness over time and between different types of
microcomputer buyers. Large business and public sector buyers could not evade the trade-barrier,
because they were too easy a target for enforcement raids. In contrast, smugglers dominated the
market for small purchases. In the latter case, the buyer had to rely on an illegal service sector in the
event of technical problems. Many anecdotes suggest that the vast majority of individual buyers went
elsewhere because the illegal imports were better. By some estimates, smuggling amounted to 65% of
the total PC market by 1991 (Chicago Tribune . 11/04/91).
Since the domestic firms did not produce for export, they produced almost exclusively for
large domestic firms and public sector buyers. Table 1 presents the history of the sales of legally-
supplied computers. Ten major producers dominated the domestic microcomputer industry throughout
the 1980s by supplying around 80 percent of total legally-supplied sales. Brazilian firms specialized in
producing reverse-engineered clones of American-firm designs, first the 8-bit designs and then 16-bit
designs. Systems using every known hardware architecture became available at one time or another,
including those using CP/M operating system, IBM-PC clones using MS-DOS, and clones of Apple
corporation's designs. Following the diffusion patterns in the United States, IBM-PC clones based on
Intel chips became the dominant design in Brazil by the mid 1980s. Table 2 presents market share of
8 and 16 bit designs.
By the end of the 1980s, the informatics laws were widely perceived as a costly nuisance at
best and, at worst, a costly impediment to productivity advance in export-oriented industries.
'For example, foreign companies, such as IBM and Burroughs, were allowed to produce mainframes. But they
were completed excluded from the microcomputer sector.
4particularly those using numerically controlled machine tools (Kang and Steinmueller [1991]), such as
automobile production. The laws had little popular support. During the election campaign of 1990,
Collor promised to phase-out protection and dismantle the agencies enforcing the laws by the end of
1992. After his ascension to office, he put these plans into effect, which produced dramatic results.
Buyers curtailed their purchases of domestic products because they anticipated easier access to
international markets and weak enforcement of the trade barriers. Several domestic firms quickly
went into a dramatic decline. Many Brazilian engineers lost their jobs and those who remained
eventually became sales representatives of the joint ventures formed with multinational companies.
Fifteen years of informatics policy had clearly failed to develop a domestic industry with
technology autonomy and competitive prices. Brazilian firms had not caught up to their international
counterparts. Many reasons have been offered for this, such as:
(1) Imported chips and domestically produced peripherals (e.g., hard disks), which constituted a large
expense in the basic processor, were costly to obtain (Tigre [1989]).
(2) Domestic content laws forced Brazilian computer manufacturers to use domestic suppliers for
inputs. However, the industries that supplied basic microelectronic inputs, such as transistors,
capacitors and picture tubes, were highly concentrated and not internationally competitive. Prices
were around 2 to 5 times the international levels (Paiva [1988], page 226).
(3) Burdensome bureaucratic requirements and misguided sectorial policies limited competition and
the entry of new suppliers (Spiller [1987a, b]). Luzio [1993] contains a more developed discussion of
these factors.
3. Data
The data used in this paper come from two sources. Some of it, such as those shown already,
comes from reports compiled by the Special Secretariat for Informatics (SEI), the Brazilian agency
5primarily in cliarge of enforcing the informatics laws. A compilation of this data can be found in
Luzio [1993]. The novel data set in this paper, on the performance of individual computer models,
comes from the price lists published by the newspaper A Folha de Sao Paulo over eight consecutive
years. The data set extends over thirty one quarters, from October 1984 to July 1992. In the total
there are 2,461 observations on 513 different computer models manufactured by Brazilian firms.
Each observation was described by 47 different variables, 40 of which were dummies. Most
of these variables mimic variables used in previous hedonic studies of computers (Berndt and
Griliches [1993], Triplett [1989]). The technical characteristics of microcomputers were described
by: (1) the amount of megabytes of the hard drive, LHRD (=log(HRD+ 1)): the number of kilobytes
that the floppy disk could read, LFLP (=log (FLP+ 1)); (3) the amount of random access memory
available in kilobytes, LRAM (=log(RAM)); and, (4) the number of other hardware devices, such as
back-up tape, LACC (=log(ACC+l). In addition, price variables were computed in two forms: real
cruzados (LPBR) and dollars (LPUS)l
The dummy variables used were of four types. The first set of dummy variables described
technical aspects such as: (6) whether or not the equipment included a monitor, MON (= 1 if yes,
zero otherwise); (7) the architecture followed, i.e., TAPP (=1 if Apple clone, zero otherwise), TIBM
(= 1 if IBM-PC clone) and TOTH (=1 if an architecture different than IBM and Apple)'; and (8) the
number of bytes of the microprocessor, P8 (=1 if 8 bits, zero otherwise), P16 (= 1 if 16 bits) and
P32 (=1 if 32 bits or more). The second set of dummy variables described any unmeasured quality
dimension (e.g., "reputation" and maintenance network) associated with the leading Brazilian
producers, that is, the "make effect". The producers were classified in two groups: the top ten
^The real cruzado series was calculated using the IGP-DI price index with 12/1989=100. The exchange rate
used to compute the dollar values was the official rate.
' Note that all domestically produced PCs were clones of well-known, typically American, designs. However,
there was no Brazilian production of PCs by IBM, Apple, and so on.
6producers, BTOP, and the others BOTH. Table 3 includes a list of these characteristics and sample
statistics.
The third type of dummies capture time effects on prices. There were 31 time dummies, one
for each quarter, defined as Tij, where i is the quarter and j is the year (for example, T384 refers to
the third quarter of 1984). Finally, the fourth type of dummy variable describes the age of model. As
noted before, there are nine age dummies: Ai, with i being the number of semesters of age, that is,
i=0,l,...,8. So a model with A4 equals to one indicates that it has 4 semesters or two years of age.
When a model's price is first published, AO equals to one. Table 4 lists the statistics for those
variables.
Exact multicolinearity among some variables imposed restrictions to our analysis. For
example, note the following identities:
BTOP + BOTH = 1
P8 + P16 + P32 = 1
TAPP + TOTH = P8
TAPP + TIBM + TOTH = 1
TIBM = P16 + P32
TIBM + P8 = 1
As a consequence, the variables BOTH, P8, TIBM and TOTH were not used in the regressions
below. These exclusions affect the interpretation of the coefficients of the remaining variables. For
example, the coefficient of TAPP indicates the value of Apple technology relative to other
technologies, excluding IBM clones, which is capture by P16 and P32. Moreover, due to the fact that
the price of most of the models with technologies other than Apple and IBM did not include a
monitor, the coefficient of MON reflects not only the value of a system with a monitor, but also the
fact that the computer is either an IBM or an Apple clone.
74. The performance of the Brazilian computer industry
We divide our analysis into two sections. This section performs a standard hedonic analysis of
computer model data. The next section compares the Brazilian performance against the US industry,
which stands in for international best practice.
We follow standard hedonic techniques for estimating technical change in a differentiated
product industry. We estimate an equation of the form:
/ny;=a^+Yii*9o.*SYA*S<PA-^SB;nX^.-^H, (4)
where Y; is the log of the price of computer model i, X^ are its k characteristics, D^ and Ajt are time
and age dummies respectively and fi-^, is iid across observations. We use 7t to compute an index of the
technical change embedded in price, but not accounted for by product characteristics. That is, we
estimate P./Pj by 100*exp(7, - 7,) for all t*.
As explained above, we use two different price variables. One is standardized in Brazilian
cruzeiros and the other in US dollars. Table 5, 6 and 7 present our estimates of the hedonic equation
for each different type of price and for the sample with all firms. The estimates of B are not very
sensitive to changes in monetary standard, but the estimates of the real price index are, not
surprisingly. As in previous estimates on US data (Berndt and Griliches [1993]), characteristics of the
computer system positively predict its prices. Among LRAM, LFLP, LHRD and LACC, the
estimated coefficients indicate that the RAM memory, hard disk capacity and accessories (for dollar
price) contributed most to the price formation.
These estimates are consistent with the producers' complaints about the high costs of
microelectronic components and peripherals reported in Luzio (1993). However, since these estimates
'' As is well known (Beradt [1991]) these indexes are biased estinaates of the rate of technical change. To correct
for the bias we can employ the approximation used by previous hedonic researchers (Triplett [1989]), i.e., add half
of the squared standard error to the estimate before taking the exponential. Because of the low standard errors in
our estimates, there is little difference between the biased and unbiased indexes.
8are in logs and not levels, one has to be cautious about inferring much about the cost of upgrades in
practice. That is, even though the estimates of the LRAM coefficient is greater than LFLP's, an
upgrade of RAM memory could raise the price by less than an upgrade of floppy disks. For example,
a floppy disk upgrade could involve a jump from 360 Kb to 720 Kb (100% change), while a memory
upgrade could move from 640 Kb to 720 Kb. Thus, the final effects on prices of such upgrades would
be 9.1% and 4.5% respectively.
Interpreting the dummy variables of technical characteristics, MON, TAPP, BTOP, P16, P32,
requires taking the exponent of the coefficient estimate. For example, the price ratio between a system
with and without monitor would be 2.76 (=EXP(1.016)). Note that such a high ratio is due to the
fact that MON captures not just the existence of a monitor, but it also distinguishes between machines
based on Apple and IBM technologies from other architectures (Sinclair, MSX). In other words, a
system based on IBM or Apple technology with a monitor would cost 2.76 times more than a system
without monitor and based on different technologies. Such difference may arise because Apple and
IBM clones were the most popular systems. In addition, note that a 16-bit machine would cost 1.28
(=EXP(0.25)) more than another with a 8-bit microprocessor. A 32-bit machine would cost 1.91
more than a 8-bit one.
The other set of dummy variables of interest is the one describing the models' ages. The
means show that 59.3% of the observations were one-year old or younger. Only 12.7% of the
observations were older than three years. Therefore, the majority of the microcomputer models (if
proportional to the number of observations) either changed their technical characteristics often and/or
they did not survive more than one year in the market, which suggests a high rate of exit. A similar
phenomenon was also observed in Berndt & Griliches data on the US microcomputer industry. Rather
than display the effect of this phenomenon on the estimated price indexes, as in Berndt and Griliches,
we adopt a standard specification that uses only age and year effects. This is the easiest specification
9to use and our qualitative results are not sensitive to this standardization.
Most of the estimates of the age coefficients indicate that young models were cheaper than old
ones. For example, the ratio of the price of a model of one-year old or less to other models is 0.92
(=EXP(-.0.81)), while the ratio of a model of four-year old is 1.39 (=EXP(0.327)). This result
suggests that consumers valued models that survived longer years more than new ones. Moreover,
new models were sold at a discount relative to older models, which may be a consequence of lower
production costs. Alternatively, the discount on new equipments could be a form of remuneration to
the consumer willing to take the risk of buying a model whose production could be discontinued after
a year. If so, old models had a price premium for the recognition of a long track of marketing
success, and therefore a stable maintenance network and resale price.
Table 7 presents the implied price index for each set of estimates. While the price indices
fluctuate from one quarter to another, a steady downward decline is evident: -7.958 percent per
quarter over all eight years of the sample. Two factors, both representing changes in Brazilian
government policy, make an obvious difference:
(1) The freeze of the official Cruzado/Dollar exchange rate from 3/1986 to 9/1986 and from 1/1989
to 3/1989 influenced the price index estimates during those months, which is clearly artificial. Once
the freeze was lifted, the ratio of prices resorts back to its old pattern. Moreover, further fluctuations
in the price index were provoked by the exchange rate policy of the first years of the 1990s. At that
time, the government depreciated the exchange rate faster than the inflation rate and vice-versa (e.g.,
from 1990 to July of 1992, the cruzeiro depreciated 5,479 percent, while the inflation reached 4,593
percent).
(2) The election of President Collor (and the implied threat to eliminate informatics laws) is also
evident. From 1984 to 1990 the rate of implied price decline is -4.587 percent per quarter. After
1990 the rate of implied price decline is -14.96 percent per quarter, with an enormous decline coming
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in 1990, right after the election.
These initial results support two conclusions. First, the Brazilian microcomputer industry, like
its counterparts all over the world, continued to advance over the entire 8 years. Despite some
variation in the measured rate of advance, the rate of advance was rapid overall. Second, the rate of
advance significantly accelerated after the beginning of the CoUor presidency. This change is
consistent with anecdotes about dramatic declines in the domestic firms in the 1990s.
5. The opportunity costs of protection
We use two different standards for measuring the opportunity costs of protection. First, we
directly compare levels and rates of change of price/performance in Brazil against similar
price/performance measures in the United States, which proxies for best practice world-wide. Second,
we estimate the change in consumer surplus that would have occurred in Brazil had they had access to
US markets.
5.1 Comparison of Brazilian and international technical advance
We first estimate the relative size of prices in Brazil to US prices, holding constant for
system characteristics. We estimate this by taking the average system characteristics of a Brazilian
system in 1984 and estimate its price in the US and Brazil by:
=e
We compare this with an estimate of that exact same system's price in the US, using the
hedonic estimates of Berndt and Griliches [1993]. We can estimate the relative prices for all years
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after 1984 by using the implied rates of technical change from the hedonic estimates^. This approach
has the advantage that we can derive relative estimates even though we do not know the average
characteristics of the systems available in the US in each year of interest.
Table 8 shows the price ratios for 1984 and for all subsequent years. In the first year, the US
computers were roughly half the price of their equivalent Brazilian counterparts (0.534). By 1988 the
ratio was 0.789. Though the prices of Brazilian microcomputers did decline at a rapid rate, they never
caught up with their US counter-parts in terms of price performance.
Another way to illustrate this is shown in figure 1. It compares the estimated
price/performance marks for both the US and Brazil over the years we have estimates. It is possible
to see how many years Brazilian microcomputers' prices/performance were behind US
prices/performance for equivalent systems. Brazil's 1985 price/performance represented the mid-1981
price/performance in the United States. By 1990, Brazil's price/performance in was more than five
years behind best practice in the United States. The gap widened from 1984 to 1990, with exception
of 1988-1989 in which the exchange rate is manipulated, as noted above. It fell considerably after
1990, as expected, reducing the technology gap to 4 years.
5.2 Consumer surplus estimates
We consider an alternative method for quantifying the opportunity costs of protection. We
provide an estimate of the change in consumer surplus that would result from opening up the
Brazilian market to cheaper outside imports. We do not wish to suggest that our estimate is exactly
right. Rather, we wish to show that with a fairly simple and plausible model, the magnitude of lost
consumer surplus must be large. We are convinced that any other estimate will show results of the
* We checked this procedure against the obvious alternative: using the mean system characteristics for 1985,
1986, and so on, and then computing the implied prices for the US thereafter. We found no substantial differences
in the estimates, so we only show one set.
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same magnitude or more.
We adopt methodology first developed by Griliches [1958] and extended by Flamm [1987].
Under a constant elasticity demand curve, P = aQ", a second order Taylor expansion for the gain in
consumer surplus from a decrease in prices from Pq to P, is
CS=kP,Q,[l-(k^)] (3)
where, e is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand; and k is the yield, or the gain from
the (marginal or average) cost reduction caused by the new technology. Thus, the yield k in the year 1
would be:
it,=l-^ (4)
P
Even though the price ratio cannot be observed accurately, we used the 0.53 benchmark ratio.
The yield for the subsequent years can be approximated using the rate of price change between the
hedonic indexes in the United States and Brazil from 1984 to 1988, when the Bemdt and Griliches
[1993] study ends. For example, the yield of moving from the market reserve to free imports in 1985
would be:
p
P
where,
Before reporting the results it is important to call the attention to the fact that this estimate of
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the opportunity costs of the informatics laws is likely an underestimate of the true gains from bringing
down barriers to foreign competition. First, consumer surplus is a partial equilibrium measure of
opportunity costs, which ignores the general equilibrium benefits to downstream users of improved
micro-computers (e.g., long-run changes in investment behavior). Second, constant price elasticity of
demand is a strong assumption for a growing market undergoing rapid technical change. It provides
no estimate of the benefit from increases in the variety of models available or an extension in the
capabilities of models. Third, we use Flamm's estimates of the elasticity of demand for all computing
equipment, estimated on US data. His estimates are on the order of -1.5. More elastic demand for
PCs alone, as is likely due to competition from smuggled PC's and other types of computers, would
result in a much higher benefit from price decline than we estimate. Nonetheless, this measure
provides a lower-bound ball-park estimate of the opportunity costs from a change in prices.
Moreover, this methodology has not been used by any previous study that we are aware of.
Table 9 presents the results. The consumer surplus ranged from 79.6 to 277.0 million dollars,
during 1984-88, which are large amounts compared to the total expenditure on legal sales each year
for the same period, which range from 126 to 745 million dollars. Over the whole period, the lost
consumer surplus comes to 716.4 million or 33 percent of total expenditure on legal systems.
It is not possible to make a similar prediction about producer surplus without information
about the elasticity of domestic supply or the levels of domestic costs of supply and how it changed
over time. Standard analysis only suggests that the absolute value of the gains to producers will be a
fraction of the losses to consumers. Even if that fraction is around fifty percent, our estimates suggest
that Brazilian firms received a large benefit from the protection.
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In sum, these figures demonstrate the large costs associated with protecting this industry. Not
only did the Brazilian firms remain less efficient than international standards, but their product
improved at a slower rate. The opportunity costs to users of protecting this industry had to be large.
6. Conclusion
Personal computers were but one of many industries covered by the informatics laws in
Brazil. It is an important and interesting case, because it is representative of all industries that grew
up under the import protection. It also offers us an opportunity to understand the costs of protecting
an industry, since there were well-documented international standards.
We found that the Brazilian PC industry advanced at a rate that was comparable to
international rates of technical advance (or slightly slower), but the prices of legal Brazilian PCs
started higher and stayed higher than their potential international competition. Technical frontiers
perpetually lagged price/performance practices in international markets by three years and as much as
five. The opportunity cost of following this protective policy rather than opening up to international
markets (i.e. forgone surplus) was on the order of 716.4 million US dollars, or roughly a third of the
total expenditure on domestically produced micro-computers.
Further work should consider the efficacy of import protection of high-technology in light of
these costs. Government policy for encouraging high-technology firms may have less costly
approaches available, such as direct subsidies to research and development. In addition, further
research should identify which aspects of the protection influenced the costs borne by Brazilian
consumers of PCs. Luzio [1993] contains such a study.
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Table 1
Total Value (Millions of Real Cr$)'
and Quantity Produced of Small-Size Computers Compared to Microcomputers (referred as
"Micros")
Year Total Value of
all small
computers
Total value
of Micros
% Total Units of
small
computers
Total
units of
Micros
%
1980 18.61 13.59 73 1414 614 43
1981 31.52 22.69 72 2307 1516 66
1982 62.69 52.03 83 23432 22459 96
1983 54.07 46.5 86 56464 55711 99
1984 70.37 63.33 90 90101 89272 99
1985 146.43 108.36 74 158429 157338 99
1986 240.41 189.92 79 185875 183056 98
1987 118.14 98.06 83 141072 138874 98
1988 215.54 140.1 65 72208 70534 98
1989 259.21 189.22 73 95408 92461 97
1990 223.68 163.29 73 102452 99020 97
Source: The figures were computed based on data from SEI (1987, 1989), DEPIN (1991).
*The real Cr$ values were calculated based on the accumulated index of inflation (IGP with 1980 = 100), in
order to avoid eventual distortions caused by currency depreciation from government's macroeconomic policies.
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Table 2
Quantity Produced^ and Value (Millions of Real Cr$)
of Microcomputers Produced
Year Values
bit
% Value 16
bit
% Units 8
bit
% Units 16
bit
%
1985 68.65 63 34.97 32 147603 94 9735 6
1986 59.2 31 124.17 65 144900 79 38156 21
1987 18.05 18 71.78 73 92032 66 46842 34
1988 9.64 7 126.67 90 21350 30 48930 69
1989 10.36 5 158.58 84 14875 16 75366 82
1990 22.81 14 120.49 74 20830 21 71938 73
Source: Real values were computed based on SEI (1989) and Depin (1991). Note that the percentage
values refer to the total of the microcomputer sector from Table 2.1.
The number of units produced changed dramatically from 1987 to 1988 due to the difference in the sample of
firms. Thus, the table should be analyzed in relative rather than absolute terms.
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Table 3
Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values of
Characteristics Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Value Max. Value
PBR 530,060 491,480 4,724 4,964,000
PUS 3889.5 3189.3 30 27,460
RAM 666.8 710 2 4096
FLP 405.4 265.6 1000
HRD 9.3 16.2 160
ACC 0.04 0.2
MON 0.831 0.375
TAPP 0.118 0.323
TIBM 0.7725 0.419
TOTH 0.109 0.312
BTOP 0.2372 0.426
BOTH 0.763 0.426
P8 0.228 0.419
P16 0.729 0.445
P32 0.044 0.215
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Table 4
Statistics of the Age Dummies
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
AO 0.170 0.376
Al 0.255 0.436
A2 0.168 0.373
A3 0.085 0.279
A4 0.057 0.232
A5 0.031 0.173
A6 0.014 0.116
A7 0.010 0.098
A8 0.117 0.107
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Table 5
Results from Regression (4) for All Manufacturers
Variable PUS$ PBR
Constant 4.639*
(0.126)
10.203*
(0.137)
LRAM 0.361*
(0.020)
0.361*
(0.020)
LFLP 0.091*
(0.007)
0.084*
(0.007)
LHRD 0.136*
(0.007)
0.136*
(0.007)
LACC 0.443*
(0.07)
0.031*
(0.001)
MON 1.016*
(0.046)
1.053*
(0.046)
TAPP 0.437*
(0.045)
0.451*
(0.045)
BTOP -0.033
(0.025)
-0.030
(0.025)
P16 0.250*
(0.054)
0.266*
(0.054)
P32 0.626*
(0.083)
0.647*
(0.083)
R-Square 0.811 0.805
No. Obs. 2567 2567
Note: * indicates that the estimate is statically different than zero for 1% significance level.
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Table 6
Estimates of Age Coefficients
Variable PUS PBR
Al -0.031
(0.025)
-0.030
(0.025)
A2 -0.081*
(0.029)
-0.081*
(0.029)
A3 -0.058
(0.037)
-0.056
(0.037)
A4 0.012
(0.044)
-0.013
(0.044)
A5 -0.029
(0.058)
-0.030
(0.058)
A6 0.021
(0.083)
0.019
(0.083)
A7 0.297*
(0.098)
0.295*
(0.098)
A8 0.327*
(0.092)
0.330*
(0.092)
Note: (*) indicates that the estimate is statically different than zero for 1% significance level.
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Table 7
Summary of Regression Results for Time Dummies
(Both Dollars and Real Cruzeiros)
Variable Estimate Hedonic
Index
% Change Estimate Hedonic
Index
% Change
T484
(0)
1 - 1 -
T185 0.095
(0.131)
1.015 1.517 0.099
(0.131)
1.105 10.45
1785 0.063
(0.132)
0.905 -10.86 0.040
(0.132)
1.041 -5.77
T385 0.001
(0.134)
0.794 -12.27 -0.077
(0.133)
0.926 -11.04
T485 -0.018
(0.122)
0.771 -2.83 0.074
(0.122)
1.077 16.31
T186 -0.138
(0.124)
0.673 -12.74 -0.171
(0.124)
0.843 -21.75
T286 0.080
(0.120)
0.776 15.31 -0.012
(0.119)
0.989 17.34
T386 0.019
(0.118)
0.666 -14.24 -0.088
(0.118)
0.414 -58.17
T486 -0.031
(0.118)
0.609 -8.52 -0.158
(0.117)
0.854 106.49
T187 -0.160
(0.118)
0.502 -15.58 -0.334*
(0.116)
1.396 63.49
T287 -0.21**
(0.117)
0.450 -10.38 -0.408*
(0.116)
0.665 -52.36
T387 -0.409*
(0.117)
0.350 -22.18 -0.578*
(0.114)
0.561 -15.66
T487 -0524*
(0.115)
0.302 -13.73 -0.727*
(0.114)
0.484 -13.79
T188 -0.644*
(0.117)
0.261 -13.59 -0.904*
(0.116)
0.405 -16.24
T288 -0.543*
(0.121)
0.266 2.10 -0.820*
(0.121)
0.417 3.012
22
T388 -0.600*
(0.119)
0.235 -11.71 -0.874*
(0.118)
0.417
T488 -0.513*
(0.121)
1.048 345.63 -0.814*
(0.120)
0.443 6.19
T189 -0.540*
(0.125)
0.811 -22.65 -0.884*
(0.124)
0.413 -6.79
T289 -0.466*
(0.122)
0.741 -8.64 -0.983*
(0.122)
0.374 -9.39
T389 -0.894*
(0.127)
0.433 -41.52 -1.346*
(0.126)
0.260 -30.46
T489 -0.672*
(0.123)
0.486 12.27 -1.221*
(0.123)
0.295 13.29
T190 -0.872*
(0.124)
0.356 -26.82 -1.512*
(0.123)
0.221 -25.2
T290 -0.332*
(0.122)
0.548 53.90 -1.148*
(0.122)
0.317 43.84
T390 -0.595*
(0.122)
0.383 -30.11 -1.412*
(0.121)
0.244 -23.16
T490 -0.800*
(0.123)
0.288 -24.89 -1.544*
(0.122)
0.214 -12.35
T191 -1.339*
(0.123)
0.152 -47.02 -1.858*
(0.122)
0.156 -27.01
T291 -1.169*
(0.126)
0.170 11.76 -1.864*
(0.125)
0.155 -0.51
T391 -1.367*
(0.126)
0.134 -21.28 -2.055*
(0.125)
0.128 -17.46
T491 -1.817*
(0.126)
0.082 -38.60 -2.408*
(0.126)
0.090 -29.69
T192 -1.782*
(0.128)
0.082 -0.650 -2.428*
(0.129)
0.088 -2.04
1792 -1.892*
(0.129)
0.07 -13.90 -2.494*
(0.129)
0.083 -6.34
%AQGR a -7.958 %AQGR a -7.497
%AQGR b -4.587 %AQGR b -6.641
%AQGR c -14.96 %AQGR c -9.352
Technological Gap
-
Prices US
-° Prices Br
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Table 8
Consumer Surplus Calculations (in millions of US dollars)
T Sales Ratio k CS % GNP
1984 126.54 0.534 0.466 79.579 0.033
1985 383.87 0.633 0.367 179.382 0.070
1986 745.57 0.697 0.303 276.944 0.100
1987 644.00 0.844 0.156 112.145 0.039
1988 279.17 0.789 0.211 68.343 0.024
Source: Sales quantities reported in SEI (1987, page 76), SEI (8/1989, page 28) and DEPIN (1991,
page 56).
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